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1 Introduction
In two recent contributions, Gintis (2006) and Gintis (2007), Herbert Gintis in-
troduces agent-based imitation models (see Dawid (2007)) built upon evolutionary
bargaining games where agents use private prices as strategies. He reports surpris-
ing convergence results for simulations performed in exchange economies where
goods are strict complement. In Gintis (2007), he focuses on the Scarf economy
(see Scarf (1960)) and his simulations show convergence to equilibrium, whereas
this equilibrium is well-known to be unstable for the taˆtonnement mechanism. In
Gintis (2006), he studies a variant of the Scarf economy with Leontief preferences
and corner endowments. In this setting, the equilibrium price is completely inde-
terminate. Still, Gintis’ simulations show convergence to an unique equilibrium.
According to Gintis (2007), these results suggest, first that “a highly decentralised
Walrasian economy, under a wide range of plausible conditions, has a unique, sta-
ble steady state in which the economy is reasonably close to Pareto efficient” , sec-
ond that “the stability of a market system depends on the fact that prices are private
information” and finally1 that “a major mechanism leading to convergence of eco-
nomic behaviour is imitation in which poorly performing agents copy the behaviour
of better-performing agents.” The aim of this note is to illustrate and reinforce these
claims by studying analytically a simplified version of Gintis (2006).
The analysis is performed using the notion of stochastic stability (see the ex-
position of stochastic stability in Ellisson (2000) or Peyton-Young (1993) and ref-
erences therein). Stochastic stability methods have previously been put forward
in dynamic models of exchanges economies as refinement tools providing founda-
tions for competitive outcomes (see Alos-Ferrer and Kirschteiger (2009), Serrano
and Volij (2008) and references therein). We illustrate here their potential as equi-
librium selection devices. Indeed, we prove that among a completely indeterminate
set of equilibria, stochastic stability selects, as Gintis’ simulations do, the equilib-
rium which requires the trading of the least share of initial endowments. Minimiz-
ing the quantities traded seems a fairly appealing equilibrium selection mechanism:
it strongly echoes the principle of minimum energy in thermodynamics, it would be
compatible with the presence of transaction cost and implies a form of maximum
stability towards rationing. This last point will be crucial in the evolutionary selec-
tion process. The less trading an equilibrium involves, the less welfare is affected
when deviation from the terms of trade by some agents introduce rationing. In evo-
lutionary terms (using the concepts put forward in Ellisson (2000)), the less trading
an equilibrium involves, the larger the number of mutations required to leave its
1A third claim stating that “when even a small fraction of agents are assumed to share the same
price system and update in a coordinated manner, as suggested by the taˆtonnement mechanism, the
price system becomes highly volatile.” is not discussed here.
basin of attraction. This fact will play the key role in the proof of the stochastic sta-
bility of the least trade equilibrium which is the central result of this note. The result
is proved in the economy with Leontief preferences and corner endowments stud-
ied in Gintis (2006), but using a more stylized model for the exchange and learning
dynamics. As in Gintis (2006), agents base their exchanges on private prices and
equilibria are identified with situations where all the agents adopt the same prices.
However, we strengthen the role of private prices, taking as a reference point a sit-
uation where agents only trade with peers using similar prices. This simplification
allows us to propose a not too involve proof, though partly at the expense of gen-
erality. Further work could however lead to the construction of a fairly powerful
equilibrium selection device.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the characteristics of
the exchange economy considered in Gintis (2006) and summarize the results Gintis
obtains as convergence to the least trade equilibrium. In section 3, we introduce a
class of dynamics in this exchange economy based on the sequential composition
of trading, imitation and mutation processes for which we prove that the least trade
equilibrium is the only stochastically stable state. Section 4 concludes.
2 An exchange economy with strict complementarity
2.1 The framework
Given an n-dimensional vector of positive elements 2 ω = (ω1, · · · , ωn) ∈ R
n
++,
we consider the exchange economy, denoted by E(ω), with the following charac-
teristics.
• There are n×m agents, wherem is an arbitrary positive natural number.
• Each agent has the same utility function u : Rn+ → R defined by:
u(x1, · · · , xn) = min(
x1
ω1
, · · · ,
xn
ωn
) (1)
• For each i = 1 · · ·n, there are exactlym agents (hereafter called the agents of
type i) which have as initial endowment ωi units of good i and zero units of
every other good. So that the total initial resources in the economy are equal
tomω.
2Notations : in the following, we shall denote by Rn+ := {x ∈ R
n | ∀i ∈ {1 · · ·n} xi ≥ 0} the
positive orthant of Rn, and by Rn++ its interior.
The demand of an agent of type i at a positive price p ∈ Rn++ is given by:
di(p) := argmaxp·x≤pi·ωiu(x) =
piωi
p · w
ω (2)
and its excess demand by :
zi(p) := di(p)− ωiei =
piωi
p · w
ω − (0, · · · , ωi, · · · , 0) (3)
One can then notice that the aggregate excess demand Z(p) =
∑n
i=1mzi(p) van-
ishes at any positive price.This yields:
Proposition 1 In the economy E(ω), every price p ∈ Rn++ is an equilibrium price.
In the following, we denote byQ the space of goods Rn+.Moreover we consider
normalized prices in the simplex S = {p ∈ Rn++ | p · ω = n}.
2.2 The minimal trading equilibrium
In order to lift part of the indeterminacy on the outcome of exchange in the econ-
omy E(ω), Gintis considers agents characterized by private prices engaged in three
kind of processes: trading, imitation and mutation. In other words, he studies evolu-
tionary dynamics in a bargaining game where agents use private prices as strategies
(see Gintis (2006)).
During the trading process, each agent is engaged in a sequence of bilateral
trades. Starting with its initial endowment it tries to obtain via exchange a demand it
computes according to its private price. The main constraint put forward on bilateral
trades is that their value must be non-negative according to the private prices of both
contractors. The trading process itself consists in a randomly determined sequence
of bilateral trades which yields a reallocation of the resourcesmω among the agents
(see Gintis (2006) for details).
The imitation process takes place after a certain number iterations of the trading
process. It randomly implements a sequence of agent pairings during which suc-
cessful agents see their private price copied by less successful ones. The imitation
process hence entails an updating of the private prices distribution on the basis of
the utility gained during the trading process.
Finally the mutation process takes place after the imitation process. The private
prices then mutate (randomly change) with a low probability called the mutation
rate. The mutation process hence entails a random perturbation of the price distri-
bution.
In Gintis’ numerical experiments, the iteration of these processes entails con-
vergence of the economy to the equilibrium associated with the price
p¯ = (
1
ω1
, · · · ,
1
ωn
) (4)
As a matter of fact, the corresponding equilibrium is the one in which the small-
est fractions of initial endowments have to be traded. Namely, one has:
Proposition 2 The price p¯ is the unique minimizer of3:
n∑
i=1
(‖zi(p)/ω‖2)
2 (5)
Proof: We are looking for the minimum over S of
φ(p) =
n∑
i=1
(
∑
j 6=i
(
p · ωj
p · ω
)2 + (
p · ωi
p · ω
− 1)2)
φ(p) = (
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
j=1
(
p · ωj
p · ω
)2) + n− 2
It is straightforward to see that this quantity is minimized when all the p ·ωj are
equal, that is if and only if the price is p¯.
Remark 1 One should note that in the preceding proposition the quantities traded
are measured in normalized units (in shares of the initial resources). Therefore, the
characterization given in proposition 2 is independent of the units of measurement
(and of the utility representation as well).
Hence, Gintis’ experiments give raise to a fairly appealing equilibrium selec-
tion criterium: evolutionnary mechanisms would tend to an equilibrium satisfying
a minimum principle, the “least trade” equilibrium. In the following, we aim at pro-
viding some analytical foundations for this principle using the notion of stochastic
stability (see e.g Ellisson (2000), Peyton-Young (1993)). Indeed we shall exhibit,
for a class of markovian models closely related to Gintis’ experiments, sufficient
conditions to ensure that the least trade equilibrium is the only stochastically stable
state.
3The symbol / denotes here the division coordinatewise.
3 A Markovian model
As put forward in Gintis (2007), Gintis’ experiments can be modeled by a Markov
chain of very large dimension. Indeed, let us restrict attention to prices in an arbi-
trary finite subset of the simplex containing p¯ : P ⊂ S. Let us also identify each
agent by a pair (i, j) ∈ {1 · · ·n}× {1 · · ·m}, where i is the type of the agent and j
indexes the agents within a type. We can then represent the state of a system where
each agent is endowed with a private price in P by an element of the finite set P n×m
which we shall call a population. Gintis experiments can then be apprehended as
Markovian dynamics on populations.
3.1 Trading process
Let us first focus on the trading process. In Gintis (2006), once a sequence of bi-
lateral trades is chosen, the allocation achieved via exchange is a function of the
private prices of the agents only. The trading sequence being chosen randomly, the
trading process in fact associates to a population of prices π ∈ P n×m a probability
distribution Tπ on the set of allocations Q
n×m ( for sake of technical simplicity, we
shall assume that Qn×m is endowed with the Borel σ-algebra and that Tπ has finite
support). Now mechanisms representing the allocation of goods on the basis of
private prices should satisfy specific properties. In Gintis (2006) and Gintis (2007),
the adoption of a private price by an agent constrains its demand and restricts the
trades it accepts to those having positive values according to its price. Here, aim-
ing at a formal analysis rather than at a numerical implementation, we shall be
more concerned with the global properties of the trading process than with the in-
ner structure of the bargaining mechanism (in this rerspect our approach is closer
to Alos-Ferrer and Kirschteiger (2009) than to Serrano and Volij (2008)). We shall
therefore restrict further than in Gintis (2006) or Gintis (2007) the set of allocation
mechanisms in order to obtain a simpler aggregate picture. In particular, we shall
strengthen the role of private prices, taking as a reference point a situation where
agents only trade with peers using the same price. This can be seen as a stylization
of Gintis (2006) but also relates to an alternative “market selection” interpretation
in the spirit of Alos-Ferrer and Kirschteiger (2009): one could consider there exists
different market institutions, each characterized by a prevailing price and interpret
the private price of an agent as indicating which market institution he has chosen to
perform his exchanges4.
4In such a framework, the evolution of the population of agents could be seen as agents voting
with their feet for a trading post.
Let us now translate those considerations into axiomatic requirements on the
probabilistic representation of the trading process. First of all an allocation mecha-
nism, as such, should conserve total quantities:
∀π ∈ P n×m Tπ{ξ ∈ Q
n×m |
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
ξi,j = mω} = 1. (I)
Second a useful simplification, which can be seen as a proxy for the averaging
that would take place if the trading process was iterated several times as in Gintis
(2006), is to consider the allocation mechanism is anonymous, that is deliver the
same allocation to agents of the same type using the same prices.
∀π ∈ P n×m ∀i ∈ {1 · · ·n}∀j, k ∈ {1 · · ·m},
πi,j = πi,k ⇒ Tπ{ξ | ξi,j = ξi,k} = 1.
(II)
Now, the main restriction we put forward on the allocation to an agent is that it
satisfies the agent’s private budget constraint. This condition strictly holds only if
trade is restricted to agents using the same price as put forward above. Nevertheless
as the numbers of coexisting prices diminish, this becomes a better approximation
of the trading process a` la Gintis as “lucky” trades increasing the value of one’s
stock should become exceptional. Let us hence posit:
∀π ∈ P n×m ∀i ∈ {1 · · ·n} ∀j ∈ {1 · · ·m}
Tπ{ξ | πi,j · (ξi,j − ωi) ≤ 0} = 1.
(III)
Let us finally focus on “uniform” populations in which all agents have the same
private price. Given proposition 1, it seems a minimal requirement of efficiency for
the allocation mechanisms to then deliver the corresponding equilibrium allocation.
One could ensure this is indeed the case by assuming some general property of
efficiency for the trading process. It is much less restrictive to simply state the
property as such. Hence, denoting by υ(p) ∈ P n×m, the population such that every
agent uses p ∈ P as a private price, we shall assume:
∀i ∈ {1 · · ·n} ∀j ∈ {1 · · ·m} Tυ(p){ξ | ξi,j = di(p)} = 1 (IV)
Remark 2 Comparing our conditions to Gintis’ trading algoritm in Gintis (2006),
we remark that condition (I) is satisfied in Gintis (2006)5 ; condition (IV) approx-
imates very well the results obtained there ; condition (II) is a less exact approx-
imation but is asymptotically true as the numbers of trading iterations in Gintis
5Gintis also considers the possibility for an agent to produce extra units of goods when it has
traded “optimally”. This additional process does not seem crucial in Gintis’ simulations. As its
embedding also fairly complicates the analysis, we do not take it into account here.
(2006) increases ; finally conditions (III) (and (VIII) introduced below) are much
more stylized than Gintis algorithm and as pointed out above, closer to a situation
where agents only trade with peers using the same price.
3.2 Imitation process
The imitation process randomly associates to a population and an allocation (via
utility evaluation), a new population. In other words, it associates to a pair (π, ξ) ∈
P n×m ×Qn×m, a discrete probability distribution I(π,ξ) on populations.
The dynamics of populations generated by the sequential iteration of trading and
imitation are then represented by a Markov transition matrix F defining a transition
probability on the set of populations according to:
F(π,π′) =
∫
Qn×m
I(π,ξ)(π
′) dTπ(ξ) (6)
In absence of noise, the asymptotic properties of the dynamics induced on
populations are usually determined by the clustering properties of the imitation
process (see Dawid (2007)). Indeed, let us first point out that imitation mecha-
nisms should not increase the variety of prices in the population. That is, denoting
s(π) := {p ∈ P | ∃(i, j) ∈ {1 · · ·n} × {1 · · ·m} πi,j = p}, let us posit:
∀π ∈ P n×m ∀ξ ∈ Qn×m I(π,ξ){π
′ | s(π′) ⊂ s(π)} = 1. (V)
It should then suffice that there exists a tendency towards imitation in order to “uni-
formize” the price distribution. Such a tendency is commonly introduced by con-
sidering that, typewise, poorly performing agents copy the characteristics of suc-
cessful ones (see e.g Gintis (2006), Dawid (2007)). In particular the frequency of
the characteristics of the most successful agents should increase. If one assumes
independent inertia in the imitation process, there should even be a positive proba-
bility that the whole population of a given type adopts in one shot the price of the
most successful agent. However, the existence of such a leverage effect in the imi-
tation process would tend to minimize the influence of the trading process by giving
too much weight to exceptional events (see Dawid (2007)). Such abrupt transitions
can be prevented by delaying the imitation process (as in asynchronous learning)
or by introducing further constraints, such as an invasion threshold, on incumbent
characteristics. In our framework, the fitness of a price is in fine determined by the
distribution of prices in the whole population. This creates a feedback loop which
leads to rapidly changing environmental conditions. The speed of evolution should
be somehow proportionate. Therefore, we discard asynchronous learning for inde-
pendent inertia though we introduce an “invasion threshold” m the frequency of a
price must reach in order to start growing with some probability. Namely, denoting
by (i′, j′) → (i, j) the event where agent (i′, j′) adopts the price of agent (i, j), we
shall first assume that for any (π, ξ) the events (i′, j′)→ (i, j) and (i′′, j′′)→ (i, j)
are independent under the probability I(π,ξ). Second, we shall assume that the fre-
quency of a price can grow within a type only if it is above the invasion threshold.
It can then grow at the expense of prices surely yielding a lower utility than the one
currently achieved. That is to say, we compare the utility u(ξi,k) of a challenger k
(of type i) to the maximal attainable utility ui,j(π) = max{ξ|Tpi(ξ)>0} u(ξi,j) for the
incumbent j. Adopting such a criterion for comparing the fitness of prices will ease
considerably latter computations by preventing the need to keep track for the whole
set of agents of the utility obtained during a stochastic trading process. It can also
be interpreted as a form of resistance to change of incumbent agents.
For sake of consistency, we also consider that prices whose frequency is above
the invasion threshold can grow at the expense of prices whose frequency is below
the invasion threshold. All together, denoting by µi(π, p) the number of agents of
type i using price p in the population π, we posit 6:
∀π ∈ P n×m ∀ξ ∈ Qn×m ∀i ∈ {1 · · ·n} ∀j, k ∈ {1 · · ·m},
I(π,ξ){(i, j)→ (i, k)} > 0
⇔
µi(π, πi,k) ≥ m ∧ (u(ξi,k) ≥ ui,j(π) ∨ µi(π, πi,j) < m).
(VI)
Finally, agents should not in general copy prices used outside their type. How-
ever, a particular case occurs when the distribution of prices is uniform within types
but distinct among types. Indeed, trading then becomes impossible. The perma-
nence of such a situation is highly unlikely if agents have the slightest bit of infor-
mation about other types. We shall hence assume in this case that there is a positive
probability that agents of a given type adopt the price used by another one. Namely:
∀π ∈ P n×m ∀ξ ∈ Qn×m ∀i, i′ ∈ {1 · · ·n}
I(π,ξ){(i, j)→ (i
′, j′)} > 0⇔
∃p, q ∈ P ∀k ∈ {1 · · ·m} µ(πi,k, p) = m ∧ µ(πi′,k, q) = m.
(VII)
Remark 3 In order to compare these conditions to the imitation algoritm in Gintis
(2006), let us underline that we have opted for independent inertia while Gintis
uses a slower learning process in between independent inertia and asynchronous
learning. We also have introduced condition (VII) in order to be consistent with our
assumptions (III) and (VIII) (see below) on the trading process.
6Condition (VI) is consistent only if
m
m
> card(P ) which we shall implicitly assume in the
following.
3.3 Asymptotic dynamics without noise
As suggested above, conditions (I) to (VII) suffice to characterize the asymptotic
properties of the dynamics generated by the sequential composition of imitation
and trading processes. On the one hand, condition (V) ensures that any uniform
population (a population in which every agent uses the same private price) is an ab-
sorbing state of Markov chains associated withF .On the other hand, condition (VI)
ensures that from every population there is a positive probability to reach a popula-
tion where the frequency of each price is above the invasion threshold. Therefrom,
there is a positive probability that the maximal possible utility (pricewise) be real-
ized and that each agent copies the corresponding price following (VI). This would
lead to a situation where the prices are uniform in the population typewise. Con-
dition (VII) finally ensures the possibility to then reach an uniform population. In
conclusion, from any population, there is a positive probability of transition to an
uniform population in a finite number of periods. Also note that this number of
periods can be bounded independently of the the initial population. Denoting by
U = {π ∈ P n×m | ∃p ∈ P π = υ(p)} the set of uniform populations, we therefore
have:
Proposition 3 For any Markov chain (Πt)t∈N on P n×m whose transition matrix is
F , we have
limt→+∞P(Π
t ∈ U) = 1
where P is the probability on (P n×m)N induced by the law of Π0 and F .
3.4 Stochastic stability and equilibrium selection
The previous proposition together with condition (IV) allows us to identify the limit
set of Markov processes based on F with the equilibrium set of the economy E(ω).
Still, as every price is an equilibrium price in the economy E(ω), a lot of indeter-
minacy remains. Contemplating the possibility of errors in the imitation process or
more generally studying the sensitivity of equilibria to random perturbations has be-
come relatively standard in the evolutionary game theory literature under the label
of stochastic stability (see Fudenberg and Levine (1998), Kandori and al. (1993),
Peyton-Young (1993)). Accordingly, Gintis complements his experiments with a
mutation process where agents randomly revise their prices. Let us then consider
a mutation process (less specific than the one implemented by Gintis) in which,
given a mutation rate ǫ > 0, the price of each agent stays identical with probability
1 − ǫ and with probability ǫ is drawn anew uniformly in P . This yields a square
probability transition matrixMǫ on P
n×m whose elementM(ǫ)(π,π′) corresponds
to the probability of reaching the price distribution π′ from the price distribution π.
By construction this matrix is strictly positive, its diagonal elements are equal to
(1 − ǫ)n×m while its element (π, π′) is a polynomial in ǫ whose non-zero term of
least degree is equal to the number of distinct prices between π and π′ (we shall
in the following denote this degree by c(π, π′)). The dynamics of populations trig-
gered by the sequential iteration of trading, imitation and mutation at rate ǫ > 0 are
then represented by the Markov transition matrix F(ǫ) = M(ǫ) × F . The triple
(P n×m,F ,F(ǫ)) then defines a model of evolution with noise in the sense of Ellis-
son (2000):
1. F(ǫ) is ergodic for each ǫ > 0,
2. F(ǫ) is continuous in ǫ and F0 = F ,
3. there exists7 a function c : P n×m×P n×m → N such that for all π, π′ ∈ P n×m,
limǫ→0
F(ǫ)(π,π′)
ǫc(π,π′)
exists and is strictly positive.
We are then concerned with the asymptotic properties of equilibrium selection
of the model of evolution with noise (P n×m,F ,F(ǫ)). Now, ergodicity of F ǫ im-
plies that there exists an unique probability distribution λ(ǫ) invariant for F(ǫ) to-
wards which the law of every Markov chain associated with F(ǫ) converges. This
implies in particular that whatever its initial state may be, a population following the
dynamics specified by F(ǫ) has a limit probability of presence in every state given
by λ(ǫ). Moreover, one can check (see also Ellisson (2000)) that as ǫ tends towards
0, λ(ǫ) tends towards a probability distribution λ whose support is included in the
set of absorbing states of F , that is the set of uniform populations. As far as the
study of equilibrium selection in the economy E(ω) is concerned, a positive result
would then be that the support of λ is reduced to a single element which could then
be identified as the stochastically stable equilibrium of E(ω). Gintis experiments
suggest that the least trade equilibrium should play this role.
Now, the characteristics of (P n×m,F ,F(ǫ)) in terms of stochastic stability
will be informed by a graph whose nodes are the uniform populations and whose
edges are weighted by the number of mutations necessary to transit between two
such populations with a positive probability (see e.g Peyton-Young (1993)). We
have identified uniform populations with equilibrium allocations using condition
(IV). In non-uniform populations which shall appear during a transition , some ra-
tioning will occur (following in particular condition (III)). The properties of the
rationing schemes will condition the efficiency of prices within mixed populations
and hence determine the transition probabilities between uniform populations. In
this respect,the principle put forward in Gintis (2007) is that agents acting as sellers
7This last point follows form the fact that the coefficients ofM(ǫ) are polynomia in ǫ.
determine “myopically” the trades they accept on the basis of their value rather than
taking strategically into account their own demand (i.e the general rule of agree-
ing on a trade as long as the value of one’s inventory increases as Gintis puts it in
Gintis (2007)). This echoes the condition of no manipulation of initial endowments
implicitly present in most of the general equilibrium literature (but the one on en-
dowment games pioneered by Safra, see Safra (1985)). In our framework where
the evaluation of goods is thought to be signaled by the choice of a price, this can
be translated by assuming that an agent can acquire as much as it can afford of
the stock of agents of other types using a similar price. That is to say agents of
type i using price p can acquire at most
µj(π, p)
µi(π, p)
ωj units of good j. Together with
condition (III), this yields the following bounds on utilities attainable with some
probability:
∀π ∈ P n×m ∀p ∈ P ∀i, j ∈ {1 · · ·n} :
max{ξ|Tpi(ξ)>0} u(ξi,j) = min(u(di(πi,j)),minj=1···n(
µj(π, πi,j)
µi(π, πi,j)
))
(VIII)
In this setting, transitions to equilibrium prices involving little trading are compar-
atively easier. Indeed, a group of agents promoting such a transition (whose utility
at the target equilibrium is higher) has to be followed by a number of peers of other
types (whose utility at the target equilibrium is lower and who therefore have to
mutate) proportional to its excess demand. Hence the smallest the excess demand
at the target, the lowest the number of followers (mutations) needed. In summary,
the resistance of a transition is proportional to the quantity of trading required at
the target equilibrium. It is therefore harder to leave the least-trade equilibrium for
any other equilibrium than to reach it from a given equilibrium. In the language
of stochastic stability, the radius of the least trade equilibrium is greater than its
coradius. This will imply using Theorem 1 in Ellisson (2000) that the least trade
equilibrium is the only stochastically stable equilibrium of the economy E(ω) for
the dynamics given by (P n×m,F ,F(ǫ)). This is the main result of the paper which
is proven in our Theorem 1 below.
Let us however first point out that the no strategic rationing condition (VIII)
is a crucial one. Indeed, if agents acting as sellers were strategically restraining
their trade in function of their demand, independently of the quantity of trading
required, a group of agents promoting a transition would have to be followed by an
equivalent numbers of peers of the other types in order to fulfill its demand. This
would prevent any distinction between equilibria in terms of stochastic stability.
Theorem 1 For m sufficiently large, the only stochastically stable state of the sys-
tem (P n×m,F ,F(ǫ)) is the uniform state associated to the least-trade equilibrium
price, υ(p¯).
Proof: Let us first mention that the fact that m is sufficiently large is used on the
one hand to ensure thatm is substantially greater thanm (e.g m ≥ 3m) and on the
other hand to ensure that the inequalities we put forward below extend to integral
parts.
Let us then introduce some auxiliary definitions:
• A path from π ∈ P n×m to π′ ∈ P n×m is a finite sequence of states, π1, · · · , πK
such that π1 = π and πK = π′. The set of paths from π to π′ is denoted by
S(π, π′). The cost of a path (π1, · · · , πK) is defined as:
c(π1, · · · , πK) =
K−1∑
k=1
c(πk, πk+1) (7)
One can then remark that c(π, π′) = 0 whenever Fπ,π′ > 0, that is whenever
there is a positive probability to reach π′ from π via the unperturbed process
and that c(π, π′) is bounded above by the number of distinct prices between
π and π′.
• The basin of attraction of an uniform state υ(p) is the set of initial states from
which the unperturbed Markov process (based on F) converges to υ(p) with
probability one, that is if one denotes by (Πt)t∈N a generic Markov chain with
transition matrix F :
D(p) = {π ∈ Pn×m | PΠ0=π{(Π
t)t∈N | ∃T ∈ N, ΠT = υ(p)} = 1} (8)
where PΠ0=π is the probability distribution induced by F and the initial con-
dition Π0 = π.
• The radius of an uniform state υ(p) is then defined as the minimal cost of a
path leaving D(p) (i.e reaching its complement D(p)c):
r(p) = minc(s) for s ∈ ∪π∈D(p)cS(υ(p), π) (9)
• Finally, the coradius of an uniform state υ(p) is defined as the maximal cost
of a transition to υ(p) :
cr(p) = maxp′ 6=p mins∈S(υ(p),υ(p¯))c(s) (10)
Now, the application of Theorem 1 in Ellisson (2000) to our framework yields
that if the radius of υ(p¯) is greater than its coradius, it is the only stochastically
stable of (P n×m,F ,F(ǫ)). We can hence prove our Theorem 1 by showing that for
all p 6= p¯ :
r(p¯) > mins∈S(υ(p),υ(p¯))c(s) (11)
Let us then first consider an arbitrary price p ∈ P − {p¯} and determine an upper
bound for c(s) with s ∈ S(υ(p), υ(p¯)). As p 6= p¯, there exists i ∈ {1 · · ·n} such
that pi <
1
ωi
. According to (2) the indirect utility of the corresponding type of agent
is strictly smaller than
1
n
:
u(di(p)) =
pi · ωi
n
<
1
n
(12)
Under condition (III), this also is a bound on the utility the corresponding type of
agent can reach with some probability via the trading process. Now, let π be the
population such that m agents of type i and m
piωi
n
agents of type i′ 6= i use the
special price p¯ while all other agents use price p. One has:
c(ν(p), π) = m(1 + (n− 1)
piωi
n
) < m(1 +
n− 1
n
) (13)
Now, under condition (VIII), one has for the agents of type i such that πi,j = p¯ :
Tπ{ξ ∈ Q
m×n | u(ξi,j) =
piωi
n
} > 0 (14)
Hence agents using price p¯ achieve with some probability an utility at least equal to
the maximal utility reachable by agents using price p. According to (VI) there then
is a positive probability to reach via the imitation process a population π′ where all
the agents of type i use price p¯ while agents of other types use price p. That is:
∑
{π′|µi(π′,p¯)=m∧∀i′ 6=i µi(π′,p)=m}
Fπ,π′ > 0 (15)
Hence, there exists π′ such that c(π, π′) = 0, µi(π
′, p¯) = m and for all i′ 6= i
µi(π
′, p) = m. For any such π′, it is clear, using (VII), that there exists a path
s ∈ S(π′, υ(p¯)) such that c(s) = 0.One can then conclude that for all p ∈ P−{p¯} :
mins∈S(υ(p′),υ(p))c(s) < m(1 +
n− 1
n
) (16)
To end the proof using (11), it remains to show that form large enough:
r(p¯) ≥ m(1 +
n− 1
n
). (17)
We shall prove this by contradiction. Let us assume there exists π 6∈ D(p¯) such
that:
c(υ(p¯), π) < m(1 +
n− 1
n
). (18)
Now, form large enough, one has for all i ∈ {1 · · ·n} :
µi(π, p¯) ≥ m. (19)
and according to (VIII) for all i, j such that πi,j = p¯ :
Tπ{ξ ∈ Q
m×n | u(ξi,j) = u(di(p¯))} > 0 (20)
According to (VI), it must then be if π 6∈ D(p¯) that there exists i0 and p such that
µi0(π, p) ≥ m and that for all j such that πi0,j = p :
Tπ{ξ ∈ Q
m×n | u(ξi0,j) ≥ u(di(p¯))} > 0 (21)
Now, one has for all i ∈ {1 · · ·n} u(di(p¯)) =
1
n
. Hence (21) requires:
Tπ{ξ ∈ Q
m×n | u(ξi0,j) ≥
1
n
} > 0 (22)
On the other hand, (VIII) yields :
max
{ξ|Tpi(ξ)>0}
u(ξi0,j) ≤ min
j=1···n
(
µj(π, p)
µi0(π, p)
) (23)
For (22) and (23) to hold simultaneously, one must have for all i :
µi(π, p)
µi0(π, p)
≥
1
n
. (24)
As µi0(π, p) ≥ m, this implies for all i :
µi(π, p) ≥
1
n
m. (25)
And Finally:
c(υ(p¯), π) ≥ m(1 +
n− 1
n
). (26)
This contradicts (18) and ends the proof.
4 Concluding remarks
We have hence proved that evolutionnary mechanisms can select an equilibrium in
a setting with a lot of indeterminacy, according to a minimization principle rem-
iniscent of this of thermodynamics. However, though we hope that the economic
intuition is conserved, in particular that the role of rationing is crucial, the demon-
stration we give is in some sense minimal. The axioms are chosen as strong as
possible in order to obtain the simplest proof. It is clear that further generalizations
are needed in order to obtain a truly operative equilibrium selection mechanism.
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